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Gender Balance in Executive
Management: Top-Managers’
Understanding of Barriers and Solutions
from the Demand–Supply Perspective
Laufey Axelsdóttir*1 and Sigtona Halrynjo2
The under-representation of women in executive management stands in contrast
to their educational attainment, and labor market participation in most countries.
This paper examines to what degree top-managers in the gender equal states,
Iceland and Norway, agree with established demand–supply explanations of the
problem, and suggested instruments for solutions. Drawing on a quantitative
dataset of 908 managers in the 250 largest companies, the results emphasize that
the divide between demand- and supply-side barriers and solutions may be less
clear-cut in practice than theory. Our findings suggest a combination of demand-
and supply-policies to enhance gender balance in top-executive management.
Introduction
The under-representation of women in top-positions in business life is
receiving increasing attention worldwide. Attention has mostly been directed
toward the lack of women on corporate boards (e.g. Gabaldon et al. 2016;
Rafnsdóttir and Thorvaldsdóttir 2012; Seierstad et al. 2015; Terjesen, Sealy,
and Singh 2009). However, the lack of gender balance in top-executive posi-
tions has also been addressed (e.g. Bertrand et al. 2014; Cook and Glass 2014;
Gupta and Raman 2014). The gender imbalance stands in contrast to women’s
educational attainment and their general labor-market participation.
Although gender imbalance among key decision-makers is widespread,
the largest gap is found within the business sector (e.g. Davidson and Burke
2011), underpinning the need to examine this paradox among corporate
top-managers.
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The lack of gender balance in executive management is also apparent in the
gender equal countries, Iceland and Norway. In The Global Gender Gap Report
2017 (World Economic Forum 2017, 10) Iceland is ranked as number one in
the world, and Norway number two, with regard to general gender equality.
Nevertheless, in terms of the ranking of gender equality in top-positions,1
Iceland is number 50 and Norway is number 32 (World Economic Forum
2017). As of 2016, women constitute only 20 percent of the members of the
executive committees in the 200 largest companies in Norway, and less than
10 percent of the largest companies in Norway and Iceland have a female
CEO (chief executive officer) (Institute for Social Research 2017; Statistics
Iceland 2017a). This paradox cannot be sufficiently explained by gender dif-
ferences in education as Norwegian and Icelandic women have long been in
the majority of those who have completed a university or college education
(Statistics Iceland 2015a, 2015b; Statistics Norway 2015), and they have simi-
lar labor market participation to men (World Economic Forum 2017).2
To understand the lack of women at the top of the business sector, the ex-
planations and solutions have been analyzed and explained in terms of sup-
ply- and demand-perspectives (e.g. Gabaldon et al. 2016; Gupta and Raman
2014; Reskin 1993; Teigen 2002). Demand-side explanations address the ac-
tion of employers, emphasizing different forms of conscious and unconscious
gender discrimination, like statistical or taste-based discrimination, prejudice,
implicit bias, and homosocial reproduction/in-group preferences (e.g. Cook
and Glass 2014; Gabaldon et al. 2016; Reskin 1993; Turner, Brown, and Tajfel
1979). Supply-side explanations, on the other hand, typically address the ac-
tion of (potential) employees (Gabaldon et al. 2016; Reskin 1993), explaining
different career paths through gender differences in values, attitudes, and
gender role expectations (e.g. Niederle and Vesterlund 2007), or through
work–family conflict due to gender differences in family responsibilities (e.g.
Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz 2010; Halrynjo 2017; Miller 2011). Thus, the con-
cept of work–family conflict could include gender differences in experienced
levels of stress and spillover, as well as gender differences in actual division of
family responsibilities (Gabaldon et al. 2016).
According to Ragins, Townsend and Mattis (1998), “the problem defines
the solution.” Thus, they argue that demand-side explanations will be fol-
lowed by demand-side solutions, while support for the supply-side “pipeline
approach” implies a passive wait for women’s advancement, placing the bur-
den for change on the individual woman. Gabaldon et al. (2016) state that
supply- and demand-related barriers have been more thoroughly studied than
policies or instruments for solutions. They highlight the need for research that
combines and differentiates supply- and demand-side perspective, and links
barriers with instruments to analyze their effectiveness on the identified
barriers.
In this article we follow Gabaldon et al.’s (2016) recommendation by com-
bining and differentiating supply- and demand-factors, and examine in what
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ways explanations and instruments for solutions are linked. We also contrib-
ute to the literature by broadening the scope from gender imbalance on
boards, to the under-representation of women in top-executive management.
Drawing on a survey dataset of 908 male and female managers serving on the
executive committees in the largest companies in Norway and Iceland, we
examine to what degree executive top-managers themselves understand the
existing barriers and potential solutions for the lack of gender balance in exec-
utive management from a demand- vs. supply-perspective. This dataset also
allows us to investigate whether the divide between supply- and demand-
barriers, and the possible solutions, is as clear-cut in business life as in the ex-
isting theory (Gabaldon et al. 2016; Reskin 1993). As top-executive managers
are both the principal decision makers in organizations and central as individ-
ual actors, their understandings of barriers and possible solutions are of great
importance in order to achieve a better gender balance in executive
management.
Literature Review: Demand–Supply Framework
The demand–supply framework divides factors linked to persistence and
change of gender segregation in organizations into two distinct categories,
inside or outside of organizations: while demand-side explanations focus on
attitudes, preferences, and practices of employers and structure of organiza-
tions, supply-side explanations focus on attitudes, preferences, and practices
of (potential) employees, including societal constraints and opportunities.
Following Reskin (1993), both demand- and supply-side explanations may be
influenced by gender bias and gendered opportunity structures.
Demand-Side Explanations
From the demand-side perspective male dominance in management posi-
tions is understood as gendered organizational practices and recruitment
norms (e.g. Acker 1990). The preferences of employers is emphasized, and in
particular employers’ implicit gendering of understandings of competence
and other selection criteria (Teigen 2002). Attitudinal barriers in organiza-
tions may be of importance, as they relate to individual-level explanations,
which either focus on women being exceptional, or their lack of special quali-
ties (Cook and Glass 2014). Stereotypes regarding gender roles and precon-
ceptions of women are thought to be important factors holding women back
(Rafnsdóttir and Thorvaldsdóttir 2012; Ragins, Townsend and Mattis 1998).
Decision makers often reserve more attractive positions, including leadership
positions, for in-group members (Powell and Butterfield 2002), leading to what
Kanter (1977) termed “homosocial reproduction.” Social identity-theory pre-
dicts that employers may display in-group bias by giving preferential treatment
to those they perceive as similar (Turner, Brown, and Tajfel 1979). This implies
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that in-group members would receive better evaluations, creating a barrier for
the out-group individuals to join these networks (Terjesen, Sealy, and Singh
2009). Thus, if the board is comprised mainly of men, they will prefer a male as
the successor CEO (Elsaid and Ursel 2011). Reliance on informal networks for
recruitment tends to perpetuate segregation because social networks tend to be
segregated (Braddock and McPartland 1987). In contrast, it has been found
that formal recruitment procedures facilitate integration (Roos and Reskin
1984). Ragins, Townsend and Mattis (1998) observed that women are more
likely than men to consider inhospitable corporate culture and informal net-
works as an obstacle along their way to a leadership position.
In addition to discrimination and exclusion from network, the lack of sup-
portive institutional environment (general female presence in the labor mar-
ket, welfare state policies, and strong gender equality policies) is emphasized
as a demand-side barrier (Gabaldon et al 2016). However, Korpi, Ferrarini,
and Englund (2013) emphasize data indicating that women’s access to boards
of large corporations appears to be advancing in earner-career countries, most
likely because of the political correlates of the family-policies and politically
mandated quotas than because of the family-policies themselves.
Supply-Side Explanations
Supply-side explanations of the under-representation of women in man-
agement address the action of (potential) employees (Gabaldon et al. 2016;
Reskin 1993), thus emphasizing conditions extrinsic to the organization
(Teigen 2002). Following Reskin (1993), supply-side barriers include the size
of the labor supply and the neoclassical human-capital explanation, but also
gender-role socialization, workers’ values, and the opportunity structure in
society, for example the link between the division of family-responsibility and
parental leave. Thus, supply-side explanations may relate to both individual
and structural conditions, but with the source being located outside the work-
ing organizations.
It has been documented that women have less experience than men of
senior management in general and line management, and profit and loss re-
sponsibility in particular (Halrynjo, Teigen and Nadim 2015; Institute for
Social Research 2017). The reasons behind this picture vary in the literature.
Firstly, one strain of research emphasizes gender differences in values, atti-
tudes, and gender identities. One explanation is women’s lack of interest in
management (Rafnsdóttir and Thorvaldsdóttir 2012), which may arise from
travel demands and competition for promotions (Matsa and Miller 2011).
According to Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), women avoid competition for
promotions. Killeen, López-Zafra, and Eagly (2006) found that women both
regarded managerial roles as less possible to achieve, and were ambivalent re-
garding how managerial roles would influence their close relationships, while
men perceived these roles as facilitating their relationships in general.
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Another strain of research emphasizes the sociologically inspired lens of
work–family conflict due to gender differences in family-responsibility: career
interruptions because of childbearing are found to limit women’s ultimate
professional advancement (Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz 2010), and the timing
of childbearing may have career consequences. Research has shown that
women in professional and managerial occupations benefit from delayed
motherhood in terms of wages and career, by avoiding the more family-
friendly, but less career-friendly “mommy-track” (Miller 2011). A study of
companies nominated as a “Great Place to Work” in Europe shows that the
risks of negative career consequences for those using family-friendly schemes
were high even in “best practice companies” (Straub 2007). Even in Norway
the gender gap in management is found to increase considerably after the arri-
val of the first child, explained by parents’ unequal division of childcare and
family–work (Hardoy, Schøne, and Østbakken 2017). Equal sharing of early
childcare is found to be especially demanding in the private sector and at
higher career levels with strong family-unfriendly expectations requiring limit-
less time, flexibility, and energy (Halrynjo and Lyng 2017). Although both
mothers and fathers face these expectations, it is typically the mothers who
give in to the work–family conflict and find a more family-friendly position
at lower career levels or in the public sector, illustrating the dilemmas of
“optional family-friendly facilitation” (Halrynjo 2017).
Existing Demand- and Supply-Related Policies
The lack of gender balance in top-executive management also stands in
contrast to the existing demand- and supply-related policies for gender bal-
ance, i.e. gender quota laws for corporate boards (demand) and extensive
family-friendly policies (supply).
Gender Quotas for Boards
According to Gabaldon et al. (2016), the most commonly used tools to
fight conscious and unconscious discrimination are affirmative action poli-
cies. Affirmative action can be differentiated into “equality of outcomes”
typically through quotas, targets, or earmarking, and “equality of opportu-
nity” through soft law initiatives, corporate governance codes, voluntary quo-
tas, or raising awareness (Seierstad and Opsahl 2011). Furthermore, it has
been shown that women are more likely to be in favor of gender quotas than
men (Rafnsdóttir and Thorvaldsdóttir 2012). Both Norway and Iceland have
implemented gender quotas on corporate boards, further emphasizing the
contradiction of the low number of women in top-executive management. In
2003, Norway became the first country to adopt mandatory gender quotas on
the company boards of public limited companies (PLCs) (Act on Companies
no. 120/2004), inter-municipal companies (Act on Inter-Municipal
Companies no. 120/2004), and state enterprises (Act on State Enterprise no.
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120/2004).3 In 2012, at least 40 percent of board members of PLCs and state-
owned and municipally owned companies were women (Teigen 2015).
Gender quotas for corporate boards and boards of savings banks came into
force in Iceland on September 1, 2013, applying to companies with fifty or
more employees (Act on 40% Gender Quota on Boards of Directors no. 13/
2010; Act on Gender Quota on Boards of Pension Funds no. 122/201).
Following the legislation, the ratio of female board members has increased by
9 percent from 2012 to 2016 (32.3 percent) in companies to which the legisla-
tion applies (Statistics Iceland, 2017a). Furthermore, a discourse analysis of
the media and parliamentary debate shows how influential business people
who originally opposed the gender quotas later expressed being in favor of
them (Axelsdóttir and Einarsdóttir 2017).
High expectations for spillover effects of the quota regulations into execu-
tive top management have been articulated: the European Commission has ar-
gued that, as board directors play an essential role in appointing the highest
level of management and shaping the company’s human resources policy, an
improved gender balance among board directors is anticipated to increase
gender balance in executive top management as well (EUR-Lex 2012). Gender
diversity among decision makers on the boards is said to predict reduced
“homosocial reproduction” in-group preferences or reduced gender bias
(Cook and Glass 2014, 94). If discrimination is the key factor for the under-
representation of women, the introduction of gender quotas for the boards is
argued to overcome business prejudice by forcing more exposure to talented
women in positions of power (Beaman et al. 2009). Nevertheless, despite the
improved gender balance on corporate boards, it has been difficult to identify
any spillover of the Norwegian and Icelandic quota legislation beyond the
boards (Bertrand et al. 2014; Halrynjo, Teigen and Nadim 2015; Statistics
Iceland 2017a).
Family-Friendly Policies
The lack of gender balance in top-executive management in Norway and
Iceland also stands in contrast with the existing family-friendly policies for en-
hancing gender balance in the economy. In both countries parents have the
right to take parental leave (Act on Maternity and Parental Leave no. 95/2000;
Act on Working Environment, Working Hours and Employment etc., 2005),
and the municipalities are obligated to ensure daycare resources for every
child (Act on Preschools 2005; Act on Preschools no. 90/2008). Furthermore,
family-friendly policies address both statutory and contractually based rules in
working life, such as the rights to reduced hours for parents with small chil-
dren, time to breastfeed, and paid leave to care for babies or sick children.
However, parents in management careers also have to take into account the
informal rules, based on the logic of competition. These careers typically
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require more than the regularly working hours/daycare hours (Halrynjo
2017), and may conflict with the intentions of formal rules (Hochschild
1997).
According to Lister’s (2009) review of the “Nordic nirvana,” the relation-
ship between the public sphere of the labor market and the private sphere of
the family is considered to reinforce gender inequality in Nordic countries.
Moreover, aspects of the Nordic work–family model may also be hindering
women’s career progression (Gupta, Smith, and Verner 2008): while parental
leave and family-friendly arrangements enable and encourage employees to
take care of childcare responsibilities, even paid and statutory leave may turn
mothers into “replaceable” workers (Halrynjo and Lyng 2009), thus creating a
“system-based glass ceiling” (Gupta, Smith, and Verner 2008). Despite de-
cades allowing for equal sharing of parental leave in Norway and Iceland, the
main part is still taken by the mothers (Halrynjo and Kitterød 2016). Elite ed-
ucated fathers in Norway who took little or no parental leave were found to
have a higher probability of later becoming a top-manager. Further, it seems
to be accepted that fathers (not mothers) in career jobs reduce and limit their
leave to strengthen their career possibilities (Halrynjo and Lyng 2017). Studies
of Norwegian and Icelandic elite professionals and managers show that, de-
spite strong preferences for career and equal responsibility for paid work and
family work, female managers have a greater family-responsibility than do
male managers, and thus inflexible working hours and excessive absence from
the home become a burden for them (Halrynjo and Lyng 2017; Rafnsdóttir
and Thorvaldsdóttir 2012).
In summary, despite the high level of general gender equality and the estab-
lished instruments for gender balance, the under-representation of women in
top-executive management in Norway and Iceland is still startling. In the pre-
sent study, we contribute to the understanding of this paradox by examining
whether managers believe the blame for the under-representation of women
lies with either the employers/organizations or the employees (women)
(Ragins, Townsend and Mattis 1998), and ask: do managers follow a clear-cut
demand- vs. supply-divide in their understanding of barriers and solutions for
gender balance in executive management? Moreover, previous studies have
found that top-managers as a group rely more on supply-side explanations,
while female managers rely more on demand-side explanations and solutions
than do male managers (Rafnsdóttir and Thorvaldsdóttir 2012; Ragins,
Townsend and Mattis 1998; Skjeie and Teigen 2003). Further, it has been ob-
served that CEOs more strongly support supply-side explanations than do
other managers (Ragins, Townsend and Mattis 1998), and experience with
gender quotas for boards may influence manager’s attitudes (Axelsdóttir and
Einarsdóttir 2017). Thus, drawing on these findings, we also ask: do manager’s
perception of the problem, and the possible solutions, vary based on their
gender,4 management position, and whether they work in a company with
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gender quotas on company boards? In order to shed light on the research
questions the following hypotheses were formulated:
H1: Supply-side explanations gain stronger support than demand-side
explanations.
H2: Female managers rely more on demand-side explanations, and less
on supply-side explanations, than do male managers.
H3: Male CEOs support supply-side explanations more, and demand-
side explanations less, than do other managers.
H4: Support for demand-side explanations predicts support for
demand-side instruments (affirmative actions and active recruitment
policies), while support for supply-side explanations predicts support
for supply-side instruments (gender balanced family-responsibility).
H5: Supply-side instruments gain stronger support than demand-side
instruments.
H6: Female managers rely more on demand-side instruments, and less
on supply-side instruments, than do male managers.
H7: Male CEOs support supply-side instruments more, and demand-
side instruments less, than other managers.
H8: When the gender quota legislation (demand-side policy) applies to
companies, managers are more supportive of demand-side instruments
(affirmative actions and active recruitment policies) than when it does
not apply.
Data and Methods
The analyses were based on a survey of top-management, recruitment, and
gender balance, conducted in Norway and Iceland. The questionnaire (fifty-
nine questions) was created in Norway, and translated into Icelandic.
Managers were asked, among other things, about their attitudes regarding var-
ious explanations for the under-representation of women and possible solu-
tions to increase gender balance.
In both countries, the survey was emailed to managers with a position on
the executive committee, reporting directly to the CEO in the largest compa-
nies (by revenue). In Norway, 1,296 managers (251 women and 1045 men) in
247 businesses were contacted in the spring and summer of 2014, and 404 se-
nior managers in 173 different businesses completed the questionnaire, giving
a response rate of 31 percent. Women constituted 28 percent of the respon-
dents (n¼ 114) and 72 percent (n¼ 290) were men, indicating that men were
under-represented with regard to the original sample. There was also a certain
under-representation of managers in oil-related businesses and firms with
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very high turnover. In Iceland, 1,349 managers (354 women and 995 men) in
245 businesses were contacted between November 2014 and January 2015.
The effective response rate was 73 percent (984 managers), but only 37 percent
of the managers provided information concerning their gender (n¼ 504).
Those who did not make their gender known were excluded from the analy-
ses; thus, 366 men (73 percent) and 138 women (27 percent) were included.
On the basis of this information, we combined the datasets. We controlled for
the skewed ratio of the managers in Norway and Iceland by including the
country variable in the analysis. Although Norway and Iceland are similar
with regard to the rankings of gender equality in the economy, they also dif-
fer in some ways. In January 2017, the population of Norway was barely
5.3 million (Statistics Norway 2017), but the corresponding figure was just
over 338,000 in Iceland (Statistics Iceland 2017b). There was also a consider-
able difference in the revenue of the surveyed companies,5 and while the
Norwegian sample was limited to top-managers in larger firms, the Icelandic
sample also included managers of smaller firms.
The combined dataset reveals that the average age of the women was 46.3
years, and was 50.5 years for the men. Men have more children and longer
working hours than women, more men are in a CEO position, and have re-
ceived a technical/scientific education, while more women have a finance/
business or social science/humanities education (table 1). Separate analyses of
the countries revealed a gender difference in regard to working hours in
Iceland, but not in Norway. The average age of the managers in Iceland was
slightly lower than of those in Norway, and they have more children.
Table 2 reveals no significant difference between female and male managers
in the combined dataset, or the Icelandic or Norwegian datasets with regard
to the legal and organizational form of their companies. However, while more
men are recruited internally in Icelandic companies, more women are exter-
nally recruited.
We used Statistical Package for the Social Sciences computer software (ver-
sion 24) to analyze the data. Regarding hypotheses, examining explanations
for the under-representation of women in executive top-positions, twelve
statements in a five-point Likert scale, ranging from strongly disagree (1)
to strongly agree (5), were analyzed. We used principal component analysis
and divided the statements into demand vs. supply dimensions (eigen-
value¼ 2.738 for supply and 2.472 for demand).6 A reliability analysis showed
a¼ 0.724 for the demand-side and a¼ 0.713 for the supply-side. The
demand-side dimension included five statements: too much of the recruitment
for management positions happens through informal networks; recruitment of
women into management positions is not a priority within the business sector;
women applicants are disadvantaged in the recruitment process; a lot of men
have problems working with female managers; and the business sector is domi-
nated by men with insufficient trust in women. The supply-side dimension con-
sisted of four statements: there are too few women applying for management
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positions; women choose to pursue a career path with profit and loss responsibility
to a lesser extent than do men; women are less interested in positions of responsi-
bility than are men; and women are less willing to fight for their career than are
men.
In order to examine what the managers rated as important solutions for
improved gender balance in the executive management, another twelve state-
ments were analyzed using a five-point Likert scale.7 Principal component
analysis identified three dimensions of solutions: “gender balanced family-
responsibility” (eigenvalue¼ 1.665 and a¼ 0.832), “affirmative actions”
(eigenvalue¼ 4.244 and a¼ 0.755), and “active recruitment policies” (eigen-
value¼ 1.101 and a¼ 0.936). The dimensions of “gender balanced family-
responsibility” included three statements: more equal distribution of parental
leave between mothers and fathers; more equal distribution of responsibility for
children and family between mothers and fathers; and better opportunity for
career-comeback after the “toddler phase.” “Affirmative actions’” comprised
three statements: requirements for reports and visibility of gender balance at the
executive level; preferential rights for female applicants when faced with appli-
cants of equal competence; and gender quotas on boards. Finally, the dimension
of “active recruitment policies” involved two statements: active recruitment
policies for middle management and active recruitment policies for the executive
level.
To answer H1 and H5, we compared the means of female and male man-
agers on the outcome variables (demand-side, supply-side, affirmative actions,
gender balanced family-responsibility, and active recruitment policies). The
significance was tested using the chi-square test. Multiple regression analyses
were performed to answer other hypotheses. To carry out the analyses, the
predictor variables were transformed into dummy variables; gender (women,
men), position in executive management (CEO, other managers), country
(Norway, Iceland), working hours per week (50, 51–60, and 61), type of ed-
ucation (finance/business, law, social science/humanities, technical/scientific),
number of children (no children, one or two children, three or more children),
whether the gender quota legislation applies (legislation applies, legislation does
not apply), recruitment procedure (internally, externally), organizational form
(state/municipally owned company, other organizational forms), support for
demand-side explanations8 (not demand-support, demand-support), and
support for supply-side explanations (not supply-support, supply-support).
Women, other managers’, Iceland, 50 hours per week, technical/scientific,
three or more children, legislation applies, recruited internally, other organi-
zational forms, not demand-support, and not supply-support were selected as
the comparison groups within those variables. Age was used as a continuous
variable. An interaction variable menCEO was created to examine the com-
bined influence of gender and management position on the outcome vari-
ables. The outcome variables were measured on a Likert scale from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). In order to answer our hypotheses, the
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significance of gender (Model 1) and genderCEO (Model 2) was tested on
all the outcome variables. The support for demand-side/supply-side explana-
tions (Model 3) and significance of gender quotas for boards (Model 4) were
only tested on affirmative actions, active recruitment policies, and gender bal-
anced family-responsibility. The level of significance was set at p< 0.05.
Results
The results support H1 (table 3), with managers having greater support for
supply-side explanations than for demand-side explanations: female managers
(M¼ 3.18) and male managers (M¼ 3.15). However, the low means indicate
a neutral attitudes toward them.
Second, we hypothesized that female managers rely more on demand-side
explanations, and less on supply-side explanations than male managers. The
analysis (table 4) in Model 1 for demand-side explanations shows that, after
controlling for age, type of education, country, number of children, recruit-
ment procedures, and working hours, the male managers considered them
significantly less important (–0.56 points) than did the female managers
(p< 0.001), supporting the first part of the hypothesis. However, the second
part was not supported, as gender was not significant in Model 1 for supply-
side explanations (p> 0.05). Furthermore, the means (table 3) for supply-side
explanations reveal contradictory attitudes among female managers in
Norway and Iceland. The strongest support for supply-side explanations was
Table 3. Demand-side and supply-side explanations for the under-representation of
women in the business sector
Gender n M SD F Sig.
Demand-side (Combined) Women 239 2.96 0.699
Men 632 2.44 0.689 97.912 ***
Supply-side (Combined) Women 236 3.18 0.876
Men 633 3.15 0.757 0.384
Demand-side (Norway) Women 111 2.82 0.702
Men 281 2.34 0.610 45.065 ***
Supply-side (Norway) Women 110 3.52 0.735
Men 284 3.33 0.637 6.635 *
Demand-side (Iceland) Women 128 3.08 0.675
Men 351 2.52 0.738 56.849 ***
Supply-side (Iceland) Women 126 2.89 0.886
Men 349 3.00 0.813 1.584
Notes: Data for combined dataset, Norway, and Iceland. *p< 0.05, ***p< 0.001.
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found among female managers in Norway (M¼ 3.52), followed by male man-
agers in Norway (M¼ 3.33), then male managers in Iceland (M¼ 3.00), and
female managers in Iceland (M¼ 2.89).9
After adding the management position and the interaction effect between
gender and management position to the model (Model 2, table 4), the expla-
nation for supply-side increased by 0.009 points (R2 change). The b value for
the explanatory variable of gender (men) indicated that the men significantly
ranked an average of 0.16 points lower on supply-side explanations than did
the women (p< 0.05). Moreover, CEO position significantly (p< 0.05)
changed the association between gender and the outcome variable, wherein
the male CEOs ranked 0.32 points (–0.158þ 0.478) higher on supply-side ex-
planations than did the women. In addition, the interaction effect revealed
that the difference between women in different management positions was
significant. These findings support the first part of H3, that the male CEOs
supported supply-side explanations more than did the other managers; how-
ever, the results do not support the second part of H3, in that the male CEOs
displayed less support for demand-side explanations than the other managers.
We wanted to test whether support for demand-side explanations predicts
support for demand-side instruments, while support for supply-side explana-
tions predicts support for supply-side instruments (H4). Model 3 (table 5)
shows that the first part of the H4 was supported. When the managers sup-
ported demand-side explanations they significantly supported affirmative ac-
tions’ (1.05 points, p< 0.001) and active recruitment policies (0.64 points,
p< 0.001) more than when they did not support demand-side explanations.
However, the support for supply-side explanations did not significantly corre-
spond with support for gender balanced family-responsibility. It may be im-
portant to note that the support for demand-side explanations was fairly
weak, while the support for supply-side explanations was neutral, while sup-
port for demand- as well as supply-side solutions was strong .
The means (table 6) reveal that managers believe that “active recruitment
policies” are the most important instrument for achieving greater gender bal-
ance:10 female managers (M¼ 4.27) and male managers (M¼ 3.71), closely
followed by increased “gender balanced family-responsibility.” Thus, the re-
sults do not support a preference for supply solutions; rather a combination
of demand- and supply-solutions (H5).
Based on earlier research we hypnotized that female managers would rely
more on demand-side instruments, and less on supply-side instruments, than
male managers. Affirmative action did not receive much support (table 6): the
male managers considered this unimportant (M¼ 2.48), and the female man-
agers revealed neutral attitudes (M¼ 3.24). Thus, although lacking support
from women, the results show a significant gender difference with regard to
beliefs in solutions (p< 0.001). The results in Model 1 (table 7) for affirmative
action and active recruitment policies confirm the gender gap in support for
demand-side instruments (H6). After controlling for age, type of education,
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country, number of children, recruitment procedure, working hours, and or-
ganizational form, the male managers significantly supported affirmative ac-
tion (–0.86 points) and active recruitment policies (–0.59) to a lesser extent
than did the female managers (p< 0.001). However, the results do not sup-
port the second part of the hypothesis. In fact, the male managers significantly
supported gender balanced family-responsibility to a lesser extent (–0.45
points) than did the female managers (p< 0.001). In other words, the support
for demand- as well as supply-side instruments is stronger among female
managers than male managers.
We then hypothesized (H7) that male CEOs support supply-side instru-
ments more than do other managers, and support demand-side instruments
less than do other managers. Table 7 reveals that the interaction of gender and
management position was only significant (p< 0.05) in Model 2 for affirma-
tive action, partially supporting the hypothesis. After adding the interaction
variable to the model, the explanation increased by 0.006 points (R2 change,
model 2). The b value for the explanatory variable gender (men) indicated
that the men significantly ranked an average of 0.78 points lower on
Table 6. Instruments for change: affirmative actions, gender balanced family-responsibil-
ity, and active recruitment policies
Gender n M SD F Sig.
Gender balanced family-responsibility
(Combined)
Women 240 4.05 0.865
Men 632 3.53 0.971 53.603 ***
Affirmative actions (Combined) Women 240 3.24 0.979
Men 627 2.48 0.948 108.238 ***
Active recruitment policies (Combined) Women 246 4.27 0.792
Men 631 3.71 0.964 66.791 ***
Gender balanced family-responsibility
(Norway)
Women 108 3.82 0.793
Men 286 3.42 0.908 16.571 ***
Affirmative actions (Norway) Women 111 3.17 0.908
Men 283 2.63 0.899 29.548 ***
Active recruitment policies (Norway) Women 113 4.35 0.741
Men 284 3.95 0.786 21.501 ***
Gender balanced family-responsibility
(Iceland)
Women 132 4.24 0.877
Men 346 3.62 1.012 38.572 ***
Affirmative actions (Iceland) Women 129 3.29 1.036
Men 344 2.37 0.973 82.383 ***
Active recruitment policies (Iceland) Women 133 4.21 0.831
Men 347 3.51 1.049 47.502 ***
Note: ***p< 0.001.
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affirmative action than did the women (p< 0.001). Again, CEO position sig-
nificantly (p< 0.05) changed the association between gender and the outcome
variable, and the male CEOs ranked 1.27 points (–0.777þ –0.490) lower on
the affirmative action policies than did the women. Moreover, the interaction
effect revealed that the difference between the women in different manage-
ment positions was significant.
Model 4 (table 5) reveals the significance of the gender quota legislation for
the outcome variables, after controlling for age, type of education, country,
number of children, recruitment procedure, working hours, and organiza-
tional form. When the gender quota legislation does not apply, the managers
significantly supported affirmative actions (–0.23 points, p< 0.01), and active
recruitment policies (–0.28 points, p< 0.001) less than when the quota legisla-
tion does apply, supporting H8. However, they also support gender balance
family-responsibility to lesser extent (–0.15 points, p< 0.05), thus the division
is not clear-cut.
Furthermore, all the models revealed the significance of the country vari-
able for the outcome variables. A surprising finding was that, although the
managers in Norway showed significantly less support for demand-side expla-
nations, and significantly more support for supply-side explanations, than did
the managers in Iceland (table 4), the former supported affirmative actions
significantly more (0.15 points) than did the latter (p< 0.05) (table 7).
The managers in Norway also showed stronger support for active recruitment
policies (0.36, p< 0.001), but less support for gender balanced family-
responsibility (–0.23 points, p< 0.01) than their counterparts in Iceland, al-
though the support for these two instruments were strong in both countries.
Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we contribute to the literature on the persistent male domi-
nance in top-positions in the business sector by addressing the principal
decision makers in corporations. We examine to what degree executive top-
managers understand the existing explanations and related solutions for the
lack of gender balance in executive management within the established de-
mand–supply perspective (Gabaldon et al. 2016; Gupta and Raman 2014;
Teigen 2002). We firstly asked: do managers follow a clear-cut demand- vs.
supply-divide in their understanding of barriers and solution for gender balance
in executive management? The findings show that top-managers do not have a
clear-cut understanding of demand vs. supply explanations of barriers. The
support for supply-side explanations was slightly stronger than support for
demand-side explanations, in accordance with earlier research (Ragins,
Townsend and Mattis 1998). However, neither demand nor supply expla-
nations received strong support, with means around three or lower (H1),
indicating that the traditional way of formulating demand and supply
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explanations, as were tested here, do not relate strongly to top-managers’ un-
derstanding of the problem.11
Turning to top-managers’ understanding of demand- vs. supply-
instruments to increase gender balance, the means were higher, indicating
that some of the instruments fit the up-to-date discourse among top-
managers. Again the demand- vs. supply-divide was blurred: top-managers
most strongly agree with the need for more active recruitment policies for top
and middle management (demand), closely followed by the need for a more
gender balanced family-responsibility, including more gender equal distribution
of parental leave and responsibility for children and family between the parents,
and better opportunity for career-comeback after the “toddler phase” (supply).
However, affirmative actions including reports of gender balance, preferential
rights for women, and gender quotas on boards (demand) are not receiving sub-
stantial support. Thus, the demand–supply divide is not clear-cut, indicating
how a combination of demand and supply instruments was ranked as most
important (H5). Further, the results show that support for demand-side ex-
planations predicted support for affirmative actions and active recruitment
policies, but support for supply-side explanations did not predict support for
gender balanced family-responsibility (H4), again emphasizing that managers
do not follow the clear-cut demand vs. supply-division.
Secondly we asked: do managers’ perception of the problem, and the possible
solutions vary, based on their gender, management position, and whether they
work in a company with gender quotas on company boards? The analyses of the
impact of gender and position on supply vs. demand explanations further
substantiate that the expected division is not clear-cut: although male man-
agers support demand-side explanations less than female managers do in
line with earlier findings (Rafnsdóttir and Thorvaldsdóttir 2012; Ragins,
Townsend and Mattis 1998; Skjeie and Teigen 2003), they do not support
supply-side explanations more strongly (H2). Moreover, while male CEOs en-
dorse supply-side explanations more than other managers did, in line with
Ragins, Townsend and Mattis (1998), we found no evidence that male CEOs
rely less on demand-side explanations than do other managers (H3). On the
one hand, this reveals a gender difference in attitudes and the importance of
interaction of gender and management position. On the other hand, it
contrasts earlier conclusions that female managers “blame” the under-
representation of women on the employers/organizations, while male man-
agers “blame” the women (Rafnsdóttir and Thorvaldsdóttir 2012; Ragins,
Townsend and Mattis 1998, Skjeie and Teigen 2003).
Looking at solutions, we found the same patterns: while female managers
rely more on demand-side instruments (active recruitment policies and affir-
mative actions) in line with earlier research (Rafnsdóttir and Thorvaldsdóttir
2012), they also rely more on supply-side instruments (gender balanced
family-responsibility) than male managers (H6). These findings reveal a gen-
der difference in attitudes as female managers support all instruments more
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than male managers, but also indicate that the clear-cut demand–supply divi-
sion for possible instruments is not supported. Following this pattern, male
CEOs significantly support the demand-side instrument “affirmative actions”
to a lesser extent than other managers. However, they do not support supply-
side instruments more than do other managers (H7), contradicting Ragins,
Townsend and Mattis (1998).
The analysis in regard to the impact of gender quota legislation further un-
derlines the mixed pattern: when the gender quota legislation (on boards)
applies to companies, the managers were significantly more supportive of the
demand-side instruments, affirmative action, and active recruitment policies
than when it does not apply (H8). Nevertheless, this also applied to gender
balanced family-responsibility. Summing up, regardless of how we frame the
analyses, rejection of the established divide and support for a mix of demand-
and supply-instruments become apparent.
The methodological strength of the present study lies in the questionnaire
and the sample size. By examining the attitudes of 908 managers from the 250
largest companies in Norway and Iceland, we offer a unique context of the
countries rated as the very best in general gender equality. The biggest limita-
tion we faced, while analyzing the data, concerns the differing sizes of
Norwegian and Icelandic companies, which might have influenced the man-
agers’ perceptions. Improved information regarding the Icelandic companies’
revenue might have given more accurate results. The low means, demon-
strated in the results, imply that managers question the given supply- and
demand-side explanations. Other explanations and qualitative research could
shed further light on the discourse for the lack of gender balance in top-
executive management. Differing attitudes among managers in Iceland and
Norway also indicate that it might be of relevance to explore the discourse
separately for Norway and Iceland to fully understand it. However, we argue
that the highly rated instruments active recruitment policies and more gender
balanced family responsibility indicate important areas of interest for further
exploration and further action:
Our findings suggest that top-managers have fairly strong beliefs with re-
gard to the need for changing the opportunity structure, both within organi-
zations and in society, to increase the gender balance in executive
management. The support for active recruitment policies points toward man-
agers’ belief in companies’ responsibilities to increase the gender balance.
And by stating the importance of improved gender balance in family-
responsibility, the results demonstrate how the societal opportunity structure
entails a gender traditional division of family-responsibility among top-
managers, illustrating how the Nordic work–family model, despite all the ad-
vantages, might also be a hindrance to women’s executive careers (Gupta,
Smith, and Verner 2008; Halrynjo 2017). The claim highlights the relevance of
both societal and organizational responsibility to encourage a more equal
distribution of parental leave and responsibility between parents. The
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interpretation of Ragins, Townsend and Mattis (1998), that support for the
supply-side “pipeline approach” implies a passive wait for women’s advance-
ment and places the burden on the individual woman, may therefore be a fal-
lacy. Instead our findings highlight the need to further explore how women’s
career trajectories are influenced by the interaction between (lack of) active re-
cruitment policies, at the middle as well as executive level, and (lack of) gen-
der balanced family-responsibility, including more gender equal division of
parental leave and the responsibility for children. The supportive attitudes to-
ward active recruitment policies should encourage corporations to take action
when recruiting to the top as well as to middle level. This may be particularly im-
portant since spillover effects of the quota laws have not been identified in the
countries (Halrynjo, Teigen and Nadim 2015; Statistics Iceland 2017a). Further,
support for a more equal gender balance in family-responsibility (including pa-
rental leave) should motivate political as well as corporate decision makers to en-
sure a more gender equal use of family-friendly policies.
In conclusion, our analyses of top-managers, understanding of supply- and
demand-side perspectives indicate that the existing perspectives of barriers for
women’s career progression, and possible instruments to achieve more gender
balance in the executive management, may need to be revised. Following our
findings, a combination (and interaction) of supply- and demand-side expla-
nations and solutions should be considered for future policy development, as
well as for further research.
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1. Legislators, senior officials, and managers.
2. A total of 83 percent of women in Iceland compared to 88 percent of men,
and 76 percent of women in Norway compared to 80 percent of men.
3. In 2008, cooperative companies were included (Act on Cooperatives
no. 114/2008) and municipal companies in 2009 (Act on Municipal
Companies no. 91/2009).
4. We use gender when we refer to the biological sex of the managers.
5. While the revenue of the biggest companies in the Icelandic sample was
approximately 893 million EUR, it was around 98.143 million EUR in
the Norwegian sample.
6. The analysis found three factors, but since only two of them received an
alpha score over 70, we proceeded only with the latter two.
7. Strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5).
8. The outcome variables demand-side and supply-side were transformed
into dummy variables to answer hypothesis 7. Neutral answers were
excluded.
9. The demand-side explanation that received the greatest support was: too
much of the recruitment for management positions happens through infor-
mal networks. Icelandic women (M¼ 4.03), Norwegian women
(M¼ 3.59), Icelandic men (M¼ 3.13), and Norwegian men (M¼ 2.9).
The supply-side explanation was: there are too few women applying for
management positions. Norwegian women (M¼ 3.88), Norwegian men
(M¼ 3.74), Icelandic men (M¼ 3.59), and Icelandic women (M¼ 3.4).
10. The demand-side instrument active recruitment policies for executive level
(M¼ 4.28) received the greatest support, then active recruitment policies
for middle management (M¼ 4.26), and more equal distribution of re-
sponsibility for children between mothers and fathers (M¼ 4.23).
11. An exception to this pattern is that female managers in Iceland strongly
support the explanation: too much recruitment through informal net-
works. Together with the finding that more men than women are being
internally recruited in Iceland (table 2), this may indicate that informal
networks are experienced as a relevant explanation.
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nr. 95/2000).
Act on Municipal Companies no. 91/2009 (section 80a) (Lov om kommuner og fylke-
skommunar (kommuneloven) nr. 91/2009 (section 80a)).
Act on Preschools 2005 (Lov om barnehager, 2005).
Act on Preschools no. 90/2008 (Lög um leikskóla nr. 90/2008).
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